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Oil discoveries in many resource-rich countries in Africa and beyond have 
often led to the erosion of democratic processes and institutional structures. 
The ‘resource curse’ syndrome manifests itself not only through the technical 
challenges of monetary and fiscal policy decisions but also through the 
disregard of governments for collective decision-making in a participatory 
democracy. This paper critically assess the preparations so far made in 
Ghana following the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 2007 and 
argue that even though Ghana is expected to start its first commercial oil 
production by the late 2010, the country is not really ready to do so. To save 
the country from its oil, it recommends the need for transparency in the 
preparatory processes towards the oil production to prevent cover-up for 
corruption and unaccountable governance. The study also argues that unless 
Ghana listens to its citizens and increase the degree to which the citizens are 
able to exercise control over the government whether directly or indirectly 
through parliament, the nation may be heading for a disappointment. 
Introduction 
A historical account of attempt to explore oil in Ghana dates far back to the 
nineteenth century but frantic efforts by successive Ghanaian governments to 
discover oil in commercial quantities commenced in the early sixties. The 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) was established in 1987 by 
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the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government to embark on 
petroleum exploration. The Saltpond Fields, which currently produces about 
600 barrels of crude oil a day, is the product of such efforts (Manteaw, 2009). 
Just as many governments did in previous times, the administration of former 
President John Agyekum Kufuor worked tirelessly in the search for oil until 
its effort was crowned with success with the discovery of oil in commercial 
quantities west of Cape Three Points in the western region of Ghana in 2007.  
General studies on natural resources have focused on how to sustain 
development in mineral economies (Auty, 1993) as well as the paradoxes 
associated with oil discoveries. In this regard the works of (Lynn, 1997), 
Gelb (1988), Humphreys et al. (2007), etc comes to mind. Works and earlier 
studies in Ghana on the nation’s oil discovery in commercial quantities have 
also mainly focussed on how to manage the expectations of people (Anaman, 
2008 and Asante, 2009); deal with potential sea-conflicts Jonah, 2010); 
utilize the proceeds in order to save the country from the resource curse 
syndrome (Moss and Young, 2009) (Asafu-Adjaye, 2009); as well as the 
inter-sectoral impacts of oil production in Ghana (Asafu-Adjaye, 2010).  
These studies do not really focus on preparations that oil discovering 
countries must undergo before actually going into production. Ghana is 
recognized as an oasis of peace in a sub-region bedevilled with several 
violent conflict related to elections, natural resources, like oil, diamond, gold, 
etc. Given the potential of oil find to degenerate into conflict as the 
experiences of Nigeria and other countries show, it would have been useful 
for studies to have been conducted on the preparations so far made by Ghana 
to ensure that her oil find does not result in a curse. However, the earlier 
studies have not focussed on Ghana’s preparations to pump her oil as well as 
the challenges of oil find to governance and democratic development. 
Meanwhile, as we will find later in this paper, the discovery of oil in 
commercial quantities in Ghana before exploration has suddenly resulted in 
some level of opacity and lack of transparency in governmental efforts 
regarding the oil find and measures being put in place to ensure that it does 
not result in resource curse. This paper therefore critically examines the 
country’s preparations so far made and some of the challenges posed to 
governance and democracy by the oil discovery in Ghana. 
A study conducted by Oxfam America in 2008 revealed that Ghana’s oil still 
remained a major challenge to Ghana’s democratic governance, and that 
there was a huge disconnect between political rhetoric and processes 
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unfolding in the oil and gas sector, with citizens’ lack of information on 
development in the sector being of most concern. The study would rely a 
great deal on the findings of the Oxfam America study that put forward 
recommendations for addressing some of the governance challenges currently 
faced by Ghana as the country prepares to pump its first oil in commercial 
quantities in the third quarter of 2010. 
Measures to Prevent a Resource Curse 
In order not to repeat the mistakes of many oil rich developing nations for 
whom the discovery of oil has been more of a curse than a blessing, the 
government of Ghana and its development partners scheduled a consultative 
Oil for Development Forum on the 25th and 26th of February, 2008. The 
conference was designed to benefit from the experiences of oil producing 
countries and to collate stakeholder views for input into the development of a 
national oil and gas policy.  
Civil Society participation in the consultative national forum was very 
limited, with only a handful of representatives of organized Civil Society 
groups receiving official invitation to the forum (Manteaw, 2009). As part of 
a strategy to reclaim and open up the space for the democratic participation 
of Civil Society in the consultation process, a preparatory workshop 
sponsored by Revenue Watch Institute, Oxfam America, the Catholic Relief 
Services and other organizations was organized to collate Civil Society views 
and concerns to feed into the national forum (ibid).  
The prime objective of the preparatory meeting was to educate Civil Society 
on oil production and development issues on the basis of international best 
practice, and to formulate a set of Civil Society demands on the planned Oil 
for Development Forum. The meeting was also intended to serve as the 
rallying point for the few Civil Society representatives invited to the national 
forum to carry the voices of the many who had been denied the opportunity 
to participate in the national consultative process (ibid). Though the 
workshop had been conceived purely as a Civil Society event, it drew interest 
from the Steering Committee of the Ghana Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Mines and Energy; and both groups opted to join. Participants were therefore 
drawn from the Ghana EITI Steering Committee, Members of Parliament, 
legal experts, economists, Community Based Organizations (CBOs), experts 
from academia and various NGOs working in diverse thematic areas 
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including the environment, revenue and expenditure tracking as well as anti-
corruption campaigning.  
The workshop culminated in the adoption of a Civil Society communiqué 
which was subsequently presented to the National Oil for Development 
Forum. Another important outcome of the meeting was the consensus built 
among parliamentarians, the EITI Steering Committee and Civil Society to 
sustain their engagement and possibly, to institutionalize the platform for the 
purpose of information sharing and dialoguing on issues of mutual concern. 
For many Ghanaian Civil Society groups, Ghana stood at a threshold of 
making a giant leap into its dream of becoming a middle income nation in the 
shortest possible period (Asante, 2009). However, this to many experts, was 
contingent on a number of factors, including the development of the needed 
human resource capacity, the proper sequencing of the policy, legal and 
regulatory framework for managing the oil and gas sector, the development 
of strong and effective local content provisions, and the transparent 
management of future oil revenues. 
At the time of the forum, Ghana had been implementing the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative for close to four years. It was therefore also 
hoped that the findings of both the fiscal and process audit of the mining 
sector would guide the formulation of the governance arrangement for the oil 
sector (Asafu-Adjaye, 2009).  
The Expectation of Ghanaians 
The Discovery 
The discovery of oil in commercial quantities West of Cape Three Points, 
now christened ‘Jubilee’, marks a turning point in Ghana’s long search for 
hydrocarbons off the country’s coast (Manteaw, 2009). There has of course 
been an earlier discovery off the Saltpond coast but that is currently 
producing a mere 600 barrels per day. It is estimated that Jubilee will produce 
about 120,000 barrels per day by 2011 (Asafu-Adjaye-2009). Though this 
comes nowhere near the Saudis, Nigeria and even Angola, for most 
Ghanaians, it is the best thing that has happened to the nation since 
independence. The news has been greeted with a great deal of euphoria and 
enormous expectation. The IMF predicts that government revenues from oil 
and gas could reach US$20 billion over the production period of 2012–30. 
But whether or not Ghana will be able to use its newly found potential wealth 
to fundamentally transform its economy, generate growth, and reduce 
poverty among its people depends on several factors, most prominent of them 
African Research Review Vol. 4(3a) July, 2010. Pp. 1-16 
 
Copyright © IAARR, 2010: www.afrrevjo.com 5 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
being the establishment of a sound and a robust governance arrangements for 
the sector, the transparent management of future revenues, the government’s 
ability to maximize benefits in addition to revenue maximization, as well as 
the effective local content provisions in policy and in practice (Humphreys et 
al., 2007). 
Ghana’s oil at its Jubilee Fields straddles two oil blocks in the deep Atlantic 
waters off Ghana’s western coast, approximately 63 kilometres (39 miles) 
from the coast and 132 kilometres (83 miles) southwest of Takoradi in the 
western region. The exploration of the West Cape Three Points block was led 
by Kosmos Energy, an American company which signed a contract for the 
block in 2004. The neighbouring deepwater Tano block is led by the Anglo-
Irish company, Tullow Oil, and covers the other portion of the Jubilee Field 
discovery (Manteaw, 2009). Exploratory drilling by Kosmos and later, 
Tullow in 2007 (the Mahogany and Hyedua Wells) and further appraisal 
wells have confirmed the significant size of the discovery, estimated by 
Tullow at between 600 million and 1.8 billion barrels of oil. It has been 
described as a world-class light crude discovery, with its lightness compared 
to that of Brent, and projected to sell at parity with the Brent oil market 
benchmark price. Results announced in December 2008 by Tullow suggest 
that proven reserves – now at 600 million barrels – could eventually reach 
more than 1.2 billion barrels. The field is also rich in gas, with an estimated 
800 billion cubic feet of gas in the field as a whole. 
The discovery of oil in Ghana’s Jubilee Field holds some promise. All Ghana 
needs to do is to try to avoid the “Resource Curse” and to do this, lessons 
abound in the sub-region namely, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Chad 
and many more. The term ‘resource curse’ is commonly used to describe the 
mismanagement of natural resource revenues and its tendency to generate 
social conflict, political intransigence, unaccountable governance, 
authoritarianism, and worsening conditions of life of the people in the face of 
abundant natural resource rents. 
The Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Framework   
The policy, legal and regulatory framework within which natural resources 
are exploited are key determinants as to whether or not the resource owner is 
able to maximize benefits from the resource exploitation. The policy 
statement or document must necessarily articulate the vision of the state in 
terms of what role it expects natural resources to play in the economy, while 
specifying how the laws operationalize the policy and the accompanying 
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regulations apply the laws (Ministry of Energy, 2009). By the nature of their 
inter-relationship, it is important to properly sequence the development of the 
framework such that a certain reasonable level of consistency is built into its 
components to ensure a smooth working internal relationship within the 
framework (Asante, 2009).  
In this area, Ghana appears not to be fully prepared. In deed, the nation has 
not paid much attention to this aspect of its natural resource governance and 
as a result, passed a mining law before finalizing a mining policy. The 
mining sector has therefore to date, operated as an enclave economy that is 
not linked organically to the rest of the national economy (Manteaw, 2009).  
Perhaps, if Ghana has had a policy which envisaged a gold sector that is fully 
integrated into the national economy, it might have taken some of its royalty 
in kind rather than in cash and would have fed the raw material into the 
jewellery manufacturing industry. The effect would have been an enhanced 
value of the country’s gold exports, while the value addition would have 
created jobs and bestowed tax opportunities for the state. Currently, Ghanaian 
jewellers depend largely on scrap gold for their manufacturing activities. 
It was therefore encouraging that the Kufour-led government found it 
expedient to organize a national consultative forum to gather input into a 
national oil and gas policy. This important need of sequencing, however, 
does not appear to have been taken note of as Ghana designs its governance 
arrangements for its emerging oil and gas sector. Currently, the government 
appears to be working on the policy and legal framework in tandem, and it is 
possible that some amount of consistency would be lost in the process. Some 
have argued that any inconsistency between policy and the laws that will 
operationalize the policy could be cured at the final stage of their 
preparations when the two are reviewed jointly; but the extra time and 
expense could have been avoided if the two processes were sequenced. 
Again, the manner in which the national consultative forum was organized 
raised questions about the commitment of the then government to a genuine, 
broad and deep consultation process. Participation was highly restrictive. 
Opposition political parties were sidelined. Civil Society had little 
opportunity to make an input during the five-day programme. Indeed, Civil 
Society Organizations in Ghana including key ones like the Institute of 
Economic Affairs (IEA-Ghana), the Centre for Democratic Development 
(CDD-Ghana), the Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA), etc have expressed 
disappointment at the exclusive nature of the forum and called for genuine 
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and open consultations, which in their view, is necessary in fostering national 
ownership of the outcome of the consultation process. In spite of assurances 
of opening up the consultations at the sub-national level, not much changed.  
If indeed, Civil Society Organizations are the true representatives of a cross 
section of the ordinary citizenry, then their exclusion from the processes 
implies the sidelining of the views of the ordinary people. Given how revolts 
led by ordinary people in other oil rich African countries have destabilized 
those countries, Ghana may not really be ready to produce and export oil if 
democratic consolidation and stability is cherished. In other words, being an 
emerging democracy, the nation must ensure openness and inclusion of all 
shades of opinion and inputs in drafting the legal and regulatory framework 
for Ghana’s oil. Anything short of this means the nation is fully prepared and 
may be heading for a problem. 
The 2008 Political Transition and the Preparations towards Oil 
Production 
Issues about Ghana’s oil discovery was key in the electioneering campaign 
messages of the 2008 presidential hopefuls prior to the conduct of the 
General Elections in Ghana, particularly during the IEA-Ghana sponsored 
Presidential Debates. This was crucial because whoever won the election was 
going to have “ATM machine on his veranda” (Ahwoi, 2008). Indeed, the 
contentions thrown up by the election results were arguably borne out of the 
presumption that whoever won the elections would have access to handsome 
future revenues that could help the perpetuation of their stay in power, 
especially by bringing about the slightest improvement in the quality of life 
of the people. 
At the time of the elections, a draft National Oil and Gas Policy and a draft 
National Petroleum Regulatory Authority bills were in place, with the 
Kufuor-led government bent on adopting the policy and passing the 
regulatory bill into law under a certificate of urgency, which was one of the 
reasons Parliament was to re-convene immediately after the elections (ibid). 
The elections re-run appears to have scuttled these plans, and the political 
transition truncated the processes that were to lead to the establishment of the 
necessary policy, legal and regulatory framework for Ghana’s emerging oil 
sector. 
The new National Democratic Congress (NDC) government was faced with a 
choice of continuing with the processes began by the previous government or 
starting an entirely new process. This became an issue because apparently, 
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the previous government did not adopt a multi-partisan and a truly national 
approach to its processes and the consequent alienation of the biggest 
opposition party (now in government) appeared to have left the new 
government in the lurch. Added to this was the fact that the presidential 
control over the process led to little or no retention of institutional memory 
and capacity within the Ministry of Energy to continue with the processes. 
Another problem was what to do with the Norwegians, who had hither-to 
provided both technical and financial support to the policy, legal and 
regulatory framework development under a bilateral agreement aimed at 
supporting Ghana to implement the Norwegian Oil for Development model. 
The choice was initially made in favour of discarding what the previous 
government had done and developing an entirely new model and policy using 
a foreign consultant. Again, there appeared to have been a shift from the 
Norwegian model to the Trinidadian model. Later though, and it is believed, 
after several other considerations, the key of them being time constraint, a 
decision was made to rather revise the existing documents, still using an 
external consultant from Trinidad and Tobago. The positive thing about this 
development is that government acceded to the suggestion from Civil Society 
to let the external consultant work with a team of local consultants to be 
sponsored by Civil Society for the purpose of retaining knowledge and skills 
in-country to take the process beyond the consultancy phase. 
Eventually, the Government clarified its position on the governance model 
Ghana was adopting. The country was committed to implementing the 
Norwegian model in the up-stream oil sector, which had to do more with 
revenue management than anything else; and to the Trinidadian model in the 
middle- to down-stream gas sector which had to do more with the local 
content arrangements and benefit maximization across the value chain. 
 
Budget Deficit and IMF Conditionalities 
A major challenge that confronted the new NDC government was how to 
finance a huge deficit in the 2009 budget. The exact size of the deficit has 
been a matter of dispute but it is believed to have been anywhere near 13 
percent of GDP (Anaman, 2009) and for that matter, pretty huge. The search 
for a possible financing mechanism led the new government to seek a 
US$300 million loan facility from the World Bank, which was conditioned 
on, among other things, the government’s placing of the National Regulatory 
African Research Review Vol. 4(3a) July, 2010. Pp. 1-16 
 
Copyright © IAARR, 2010: www.afrrevjo.com 9 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
Authority Bill, the National Petroleum Revenue Management Bill, and the 
Right to Information Bill before Parliament by the end of October 2009. 
Clearly, these conditions have not been met and so a second tranche of 
US$150 million remain outstanding (ibid). 
Civil Society, notorious for its uncompromising stance against World Bank 
conditionalities, appears comfortable with this set of conditionalities 
ostensibly because of an apparent coincidence of interest in ensuring that the 
conditions for the sound and accountable management of the emerging 
petroleum sector were in place before production begins. Given that the 
country is expected to commence oil production by the late 2010, the 
conditions listed above should have been ready by now. But as it stands now, 
the nation may have to postpone the oil production else it risks pumping and 
exporting it without any meaningful regulatory framework and thereby 
making the country susceptible to violent conflict and other acts that can 
sacrifice Ghana’s peace and democratic gains. 
Kosmos Exit and Implications    
The decision by Kosmos to offload its stake in the Jubilee Fields has created 
new opportunities, and also challenges for ensuring good governance in 
Ghana’s petroleum sector. First, it has created opportunity for Ghana to 
increase its stake in the Jubilee Field. The Ghana National Petroleum 
Company (GNPC) has expressed interest in acquiring Kosmos’ stake, 
invoking its first right of refusal in defence of its declared intent over 
interests expressed by ExxonMobil, among others. Government’s intention to 
acquire Kosmos’ stake appears consistent with international best practice and 
trends. Globally, countries that have been able to maximize returns from the 
extraction of their natural resources are those that have either been active 
participants in the exploitation of the resources or have been big equity 
holders (Robinson, 2006). Botswana, which has been able to use its diamond 
to fundamentally transform its economy, has 50 percent equity in Debtswana, 
a holding company of Debeers, the major diamond miner in Botswana. The 
government of Norway, for instance, also has majority stake in Statoilhydro, 
which used to be state- owned but now is a publicly-listed company. 
The challenge for Ghana is how to finance its purchase of the additional 
shares. The thinking within government is to look for a financier to finance 
the purchase in exchange for a chunk of the shares. It is expected that the 
Ghana National Petroleum Company will make some gains from the sale of 
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the shares to the third party financier and use the gains to finance its own 
additional shares. 
The Chinese seems to be favourites in this consideration. It is believed that 
the Chinese, with a hungry appetite for Africa’s hydrocarbons, have made 
pledges of budgetary support beyond financing GNPC’s acquisition of 
Kosmos’ stake, a pledge seemingly too juicy for government to turn its back 
on, especially given its inability to keep faith with the World Bank lending 
conditionalities, and the subsequent withholding of the second tranche of 
disbursement of the loan facility secured at the beginning of the year. 
The Chinese ‘intrusion’ however raises some concern, especially the manner 
in which it is happening. World Bank sources have suggested that the 
government’s lack of haste to fulfil the conditions can be explained by the 
Chinese ‘intrusion’ and the pledge of budgetary support. If that is correct, 
then it stands to undermine the democratic processes, especially those related 
to policy, legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for oil production 
(Manteaw, 2009).  The point however must be made that Kosmos has not 
offloaded its shares yet even though they are out of the scene and there is a 
seeming unwillingness on its part to sell its shares to the government. This 
has created some stalemate and confusion and the earlier a consensual 
solution is found to this situation prior to the country’s oil production, the 
better it would be for all Ghanaians.   
The Current State of Affairs 
The Oil and Gas Policy 
A new draft of the National Oil and Gas Policy has been developed and is 
embedded in a composite National Energy Policy document. Not much 
change can be observed in the new draft. One striking feature that catches 
attention almost immediately is an apparent change in the policy objective in 
the NDC version of the policy document. While the NPP government’s 
policy objective for the oil and gas sector was for Ghana to become a net 
exporter of crude oil, a position many found discomforting because of its 
zero value addition implication, the NDC government’s policy objective is 
the judicious management of the oil and gas revenue for the overall benefit 
and welfare of all Ghanaians and also value addition, indigenization of 
knowledge, expertise and technology (Manteaw, 2009). 
The policy itself is vague in many respects and lacks detail, but this is not 
unusual practice. Normally, a master plan detailing the policy propositions 
will accompany such a policy document. Work on the fiscal regime of the oil 
African Research Review Vol. 4(3a) July, 2010. Pp. 1-16 
 
Copyright © IAARR, 2010: www.afrrevjo.com 11 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
and gas master plan is being led by the Ministry of Finance while the other 
thematic areas are being worked on or led by the respective Ministries, 
Departments and Agencies (MDAs). 
It is not clear if there will be a national consultation on the newly drafted oil 
and gas policy document, and also on the master plan when it is completed, 
though that is highly recommended to ensure a national buy-in and 
ownership of the policy and master plan.  The Ministry of Energy has hived 
off the Local Content aspect of the policy and is contemplating a national 
consultation on that, with the help of the Integrated Social Development 
Centre (ISODEC) and others. But the point remains that this has not been 
done. 
Regulation 
While the NPP government was categorical in having an independent 
national oil and gas regulator for the upstream sector in line with 
international best practice and had gone ahead to draft a bill to that effect 
before exiting office, the NDC has not been that sure of what it wants. 
Incidentally, the NDC government agreed to the setting up of an independent 
regulatory body when it negotiated its US$300 million budgetary support 
from the World Bank, and it accepted to make it one of the triggers for the 
release of the second tranche of US$150 million. The slowness in making 
progress on the establishment of the National Petroleum Regulatory 
Authority is the result of counter positions being pushed by some power-
brokers within the NDC government. While some will want regulation 
subsumed under the Ministry of Energy, others want the GNPC to perform 
that function (Asafu-Adjaye, 2010). The argument in support of the latter 
position is that the GNPC is the only institution with the requisite technical 
capacity to perform such functions. SANANGOL of Angola is cited as an 
example of an effective regulation by a national oil company (ibid). 
An independent regulator however looks pretty certain for now and if that 
becomes the choice, then of concern will be how to ensure the independence 
of the regulator such that it is able to resist undue executive influence in 
championing the national interest. This no doubt has implications for how it 
is to be funded, as well as the security of tenure of its head and key staff. The 
provision in the NPP draft bill has the Chief Executive Officer of GNPC 
represented on the Board of the Authority, which in itself creates a conflict of 
interest situation as the Authority is supposed to be regulating the GNPC as 
well. 
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Licensing 
The current licensing regime is one of an open-door negotiated-deal type 
(Asafu-Adjaye, 2009). This conflicts with the international best practice of 
open competitive bidding. It is of course understood that one needs to attract 
enormous international interest in its hydrocarbons to make Open 
Competitive Bidding Rounds yield the expected benefits, and that Ghana 
could not have attracted such interest without a demonstrable evidence of its 
hydrocarbon potential. The point however can be made now that having 
made such a world class discovery, and with the attendant interest in Ghana’s 
oil acreage, the time is ripe to go for Open Rounds (ibid). 
Challenges to oil revenue collection 
A major challenge Ghana faces with the management of future oil revenues 
has to do with weaknesses in government revenue collection, reflected in 
Ghana’s EITI audit reports. The World Bank has also indicated that 
government lacks the capacity to collect revenues and audit payments from 
gold mining companies (World Bank, 2008). It appears that with the 
replacement of the Special Mining Desk at the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) with the Large Tax Payers Unit, the capacity of the IRS in mining 
sector tax computations has been somewhat diminished. It has also been 
suggested that the loss capacity could be due to the fact that the staff of the 
Special Mining Desk had little to do as a result of the generous tax incentives 
extended to mining companies and which invariably, made them redundant 
over time. Given that oil accounting is much more complex than mining, the 
question arises as to the readiness and the ability of the IRS to follow through 
the tax computations of oil companies.  
Sea-use conflicts     
There have been some reported clashes between state security agencies and 
fisher folks in the oil prospecting area. Instances have been recounted when 
fishermen returning from sea in Essiama in the western region were accosted 
by the navy, beaten up and their catch taken away from them (Jonah, 2010). 
In such instances, the poor fishermen have had no recourse to justice.  The 
situation raises concern about a looming sea-use conflict. 
Is Ghana Ready to Pump Oil? 
In as much as Ghana is willing, it is not yet ready to govern its fledgling oil 
sector in line with international best practice. This situation therefore calls for 
a moratorium on further issuing of licenses until such time when all the 
necessary policy, legal and regulatory framework and institutions are firmly 
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in place. The country does not appear to have been guided by its experiences 
in the mining sector where natural resources like gold mined by foreign firms 
and exported have left the communities and people in abject poverty as a 
result of poor regulatory framework. Many Ghanaians including politicians 
and policy makers seem to be aware of the resource curse syndrome and the 
possibility of the nation’s economy being made to depend entirely on 
Ghana’s oil discovery to the neglect of other sectors like agriculture, 
industry, etc – a phenomenon popularly referred to as the Dutch Disease. 
Indeed, scholars like Jonah (2008) and Ahwoi (2008) have argued that given 
this awareness and the level of Civil Society interest in Ghana’s oil find, the 
resource is unlikely to result in a curse. However, given the lack of adequate 
preparation towards the oil production in the country, this position is merely 
rhetorical. Ghana is simply not ready to produce oil given the inadequate 
preparation and inappropriate sequencing of activities that ought to be 
undertaken prior to the pumping and export of oil. This is rather unfortunate 
but at the same time, not too late. A few measures are therefore suggested for 
consideration by policy makers in order to save the country from its oil. 
 
What Can be Done to Avoid a Resource Curse 
First of all, strengthening the oversight functions of parliament over the 
executive could make a world of a difference. As the peoples’ 
representatives, parliament should be the key stakeholder in the oil 
governance and revenue management arrangements, and must ensure that the 
experiences from a century of mining are brought to bear in the order of 
things in the oil and gas sector. Again, parliament will need to reassert its 
constitutional oversight over concessions, licensing and contracts in order to 
advance the broader national interest. It should also brace itself to be able to 
subject the draft regulatory frameworks, the draft Petroleum Regulatory 
Authority Bill, and other policies related to the oil production that may 
eventually be submitted to it under thorough scrutiny. Given the potency of 
the oil discovery to degenerate into conflict, the excessive partisanship and 
politicization that has often characterized parliamentary deliberations in 
Ghana must be eschewed. For the sake of the national interest, deliberations 
about the oil find must be conducted objectively and in a manner that ensures 
popular ownership of the processes. 
 
Secondly, opacity today remains as much a challenge as it was under the 
previous (NPP) administration (Manteaw, 2009). This is why parliament 
must take steps to ensure the early passage of the Right to Information Bill 
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into law. This will make for greater transparency, ease citizens’ access to 
information, and provide the ammunition for exacting accountability from 
duty-bearers. 
 
Moreover, the expected oil revenues of about US$1 billion have generated 
many divergent demands and claims from diverse stakeholders including 
community groups, chiefs, local authorities and even Members of Parliament 
(MPs). Parliamentary oversight in ensuring that the current formulae for 
revenue disbursement to mining communities is legislated and the rationale 
clearly established is important in assessing the validity of claims by 
communities in the oil catchment area for similar treatment. Again, it is 
important for the expectations of the people, particularly in the catchment 
area to be properly managed so that they don’t demand too much as a result 
of excessive expectations. In this regard, efforts must be made to also 
sensitize people about the fact that Ghana’s oil discovery must be seen as an 
opportunity for asset transformation and not as merely income to be 
consumed, as has happened in the gold sector. 
 
Parliament will need to accumulate knowledge and understanding of the 
complexity of oil revenue management as this will place it in a position to 
provide the requisite legal framework that is able to balance the divergent 
interests of different stakeholder groups including the state, the private sector, 
citizens and citizens’ groups, which can be affected by the social and 
environmental impacts of oil production activities. Parliament also needs to 
be strengthened and equipped to perform its oversight functions efficiently 
and effectively. This should involve developing its research capacity to 
undertake proper due diligence, establishing links with think tanks, Civil 
Society groups and the mass media for the purpose of information sharing. 
Last but not least, there is the need to establish a Petroleum Tax Unit within 
the Internal Revenue Service and to build and retain the necessary capacity 
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